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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--CAPTIVE AUDIENCE-PUBLIC UTILITIES-RIGHT OF
PRIVACY NOT VIOLATED BY TRANSIT RADIO-Capital Transit gave Washington
Transit Radio, Inc., the right to install radios in its passenger vehicles after a
sample poll had convinced the former that approximately 92% of its passengers
were not opposed to Transit radio. The radio programs consisted of about 90%
music, 5% announcements, and 5% advertising. After this service was insti-
tuted the inevitable complaints arose and were referred to a hearing of the
Public Utilities Commission, a Federal agency. Pollak intervened for the com-
plainants at the hearing. The nature of the complaints varied (e.g. interference
with reading, studying, talking, thinking, etc.) but could generally be considered
as an invasion of the privacy of the passengers. The Commission dismissed
the complaints with the conclusion that Transit radio was consistent with the
public convenience, comfort, and safety. 81 P. U. R. (N. S.) 122, 126.
Pollak appealed, and the District Court dismissed the action. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the Commission's
order, Pollak v. Public Utilities Commission, 191 F. 2d 450 (D. C. Cir. 1951).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 342 U. S. 848 (1951).
HELD: Neither the First nor the Fifth Amendments have been violated by
the Commission's order, inasmuch as Pollak's freedom of conversation and right
of privacy had not been substantially infringed. It was further stated that the
rights of a majority of passengers must be respected and cannot be overridden
by a few individuals. Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U. S. 451 (1952).
Justice Douglas, in a strongly worded dissenting opinion, pointed out that
"This is a case of first impression. There are no precedents to construe; no
principles previously expounded to apply. We write on a clean slate." p. 367.
The dissent continued on to inspect not only the loss of privacy, but also the
potential control over men's minds by compulsory listening and attention to
radio programs. Justice Douglas admonished the Court to be aware of undue
invasion of the right of privacy:
When we force people to listen to another's ideas, we give the propagandist
a powerful weapon. Today it is a business enterprise working out a radio
program under the auspices of government. Tomorrow it may be a
dominant political or religious group. Today the purpose is benign; there is
no invidious cast to the programs. But the vice is inherent in the system.
Once privacy is invaded, privacy is gone. (italics supplied). Once a man is
forced to submit to one type of program, he can be forced to submit to
another. It may be but a short step from a cultural program to a political
program. p. 469.
The Public Utilities Commission is a government agency set up in the
District of Columbia by Congress. It has control over the Capital Transit
franchise; it has given Capital Transit a virtual monopoly; it can allow Capital
Transit to broadcast or not to broadcast. D. C. Code §§ 43-101 et seq. "When
authority derives in part from Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise
of that power by private persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its
exercise by Government itself." American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U. S. 382, 401 (1950), as quoted by the majority opinion in the principal case.
Free speech by the speaker is not an absolute right under the Constitution
and can be regulated. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 (1951);
Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466 (1920); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U. S. 204 (1919). The Fifth Amendment includes the right of privacy
and the right "to be let alone." Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622 (1951);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928). The very purpose of
the First and Fifth Amendments is to prevent Federal Government interference
with the rights enumerated therein. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S.
233, 235 (1936); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323, 330 (1926); Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U. S. 376, 382, 384 (1896). The Constitutional guarantee of liberty
refers to freedom of all the faculties and not merely physical freedom. Grosjean
v. American Press Co., supra, 244. "The established doctrine is that this liberty
may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest,
by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the State to effect." Meyer v. State of
Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 400 (1923).
The Supreme Court has established the principle that the right to foist
advertisements on the public is subservient to the public's right not to be
disturbed. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942). Justice Frankfurter
who announced himself too prejudiced to partake in the decision of the Pollak
case, had earlier said in a dissenting opinion:
* . . modern devices for amplifying the range and volume of the voice,
or its recording, afford easy, too easy, opportunities for aural aggression.
If uncontrolled, the result is intrusion into cherished privacy. The refreshment
of mere silence, or meditation, or quiet conversation, may be disturbed
or precluded by noise beyond one's personal control. . . . Surely there is
not a constitutional right to force unwilling people to listen. Saia v. New
York, 334 U. S. 558, 563 (1948).
In Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949), the Supreme Court held that
the public's freedom not to listen was more important than an individual's right
to speak from a sound truck on a public street.
It seems evident that the right of privacy and the freedom of speech have
prima facie been invaded and there is a failure to show good cause for this inva-
sion. The passengers ride Capital Transit more from necessity than from choice.
See United States v. Capital Transit Co., 325 U. S. 357, 359 (1945). Because of
very practical reasons, economic and otherwise, they are compelled to ride, and
compulsion to ride Capital Transit is a compulsion to hear WWDC-FM. The
passengers are a "captive audience" and are so advertised by the trade in the
1949 Radio Annual, p. 363, which goes on to claim that "If they can hear, they
can hear your commercial."
It is submitted: Freedom of speech involves at least two parties, the speaker
and the listener. Both parties are entitled to freedom; the speaker, freedom
to speak; and the listener, freedom to listen. The speaker is not obliged to
speak, but once he exercises his right to speak he cannot thereby violate the
listener's right, if the listener chooses not to listen or to listen to someone or
something else. This is especially true where the speaker is a large corporation,
speaking with the approval of the Federal Government.
JOHN F. HUGHES
CORPORATIONS - AGENCY - ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.-Appellant was the owner
of certain shares of common stock of the Darco Corporation, a firm which merged
with the defendant corporation on July 31, 1950. The appellant, being dissatis-
fied with the merger, sought an appraisal of his shares under Section 61, the
General Corporation Law of Delaware, Del. Rev. Code 1935, § 2093. Briefly
stated, the statute allows a dissenting stockholder to redeem his stock for cash if
he complies with certain required steps, namely, (1) that he object in writing
to the contemplated merger, (2) not vote in favor of the proposed merger, and
(3) make a written demand for payment of his stock within 20 days after the
recording of the merger agreement. Upon official notice of the proposed merger,
the appellant sent a letter in the form of an absolute objection to the consolida-
tion. This letter, however, was signed only by an. attorney-at-law purporting to be
acting in behalf of the appellant.
The question was whether the appellant had complied with the statute, in
particular, whether the agent's written objection, unaccompanied by evidence of
authority to act, was an objection within the statute. The lower court held that
this letter was not a valid objection in writing because no evidence of authority
of the agent was furnished the corporation during the statutory period within
which such a dissent could be entertained.
In reversing the decision, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that a stock-
holder has no obligation to exhibit proof of delegation of authority, but that
the burden is upon the corporation to determine the scope of the agent's authority
if it has doubt of the fact, unless there is some special consideration which would
require otherwise. Zeeb v. Atlas Powder Co., - Del. Ch. -, 87 A. 2d 123
(1952).
At common law a merger of two corporations could be prevented by a single
stockholder, but as it becomes evident that the complex mechanism of com-
merce and business activity should not be stifled by minority stockholders, statutes
were enacted in state after state permitting corporate mergers without opposition
from an individual stockholder. Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172
Ad. 452 (1934). The statutes, while varying in detail of procedure, do not
differ in substance. 15 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, § 7157-67 (1938 Rev.
Vol.). A majority of the courts have declared that these statutes are to be liberally
construed, the theory being that the shareholder has been deprived of his right
to prevent a consolidation and that the appraisal statute is the sole remaining
remedy of the dissenting stockholder. New Jersey & H. R. Ry. & Ferry Co. v.
American Electrical Works, 82 N. J. L. 391, 81 At. 989 (1911). The Supreme
Court of Delaware declared that merger statutes were enacted not only to
protect the dissenting stockholder, but the majority stockholders as well. Schenk
v. Salt Home Oil Corp., 28 Del. Ch. 433, 41 A. 2d 583 (1945). Similarly, the
highest court in Ohio stated such construction should be placed as would carry
out the intent and objectives of the statute. Klein v. United Theatres Co., 148
Ohio St. 306. 74 N. E. 2d 319 (1947).
The leading case in Delaware, prior to the case in consideration, involving
the question whether a written objection signed and submitted by an agent
acting for a dissenting stockholder was within the framework of the appraisal
statute, was In re Universal Pictures Co., 28 Del. Ch. 72, 37 A. 2d 615 (1944).
The court there upheld the contention of the corporation that such an objection,
unsupported by evidence of authority to act as an agent, was not valid in that,
"it was vital for the corporation to know whether, at the time when the objections
were filed, the objections were by bona fide stockholders or were the acts of
interlopers who, for collateral reasons, desired to be obtrusive." The court went
on to say that "it would seem unreasonable to require consenting stockholders,
or the corporation, to assume the existence of an agency and take action upon
that assumption." Accord, Friedman v. Booth Fisheries Corp., 28 Del. Ch. 211,
29 A. 2d 761 (1944), and Lewis v. Corron & Reynolds Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 200,
57 A. 2d 632 (1948).
In the foregoing cases, it was conceded that a stockholder could act through
an agent and that the rules of agency should govern. It is a general rule of agency
that the party asserting the agency has the burden of proving the fact. However,
granting that the agent is authorized to act for the principal, when a statute
requires the stockholder or his agent to act within a prescribed period, must
the agent submit proof of his authority during this period in the absence of a
demand, or is it incumbent upon the corporation, if it is skeptical of the agency,
to challenge the purported authority? In Lewis v. Corron & Reynolds Corp.,
supra, the court stated:
The corporation was under no legal duty, contrary to contention, to seek,
them out and ask them to submit within the statutory period proper evidence
of their purported agent's authority.
In the principle case, however, it was held that the rules of agency ordinarily do
not require submission of proof, that the corporation has the burden of making
the first move by challenging the authority, "unless there is some special con-
sideration which would require otherwise." In re Universal Pictures Co., supra,
deemed the special consideration necessary was the unreasonable burden placed
upon the corporation. The appellee in the Zeeb case relied strongly upon the
case of Klein v. United Theatres Co., wherein it was held that Ohio General
Code, § 8623-72, required a dissent and demand in writing made in person or
through an agent who must exhibit his authority within the statutory period. There
it was stated:
Under the statute, when the shareholder has dissented, he cannot withdraw
his demand for payment for his stock unless the board of directors of the
corporation consents thereto, or unless it abandons the sale . . . Obviously
it is essential that the corporation know the dissent of the shareholder is
genuine and in such form that it cannot be disavowed.
Perhaps the Ohio statute can be distinguished from the Delaware statute, in that
the former holds that objections to mergers are binding and cannot be withdrawn,
whereas the latter, regards such objections to be mere preliminary steps and not
binding upon anyone.
The filing of an objection in writing by a dissenting stockholder prior to
the vote on the proposed merger is binding upon no one. While it is a
prerequisite to the right to an appraisal, the objecting stockholder is in no
way finally committed to a dissent . . . The only purpose of requiring a
written objection is to give notice. Zeeb v. Atlas Powder Co., supra.
In all the aforementioned cases the agents have been attorneys. In Friedman
v. Booth Corp., supra, it was asserted that there is a presumption that an attorney-
at-law as an officer of the court is, in general, duly authorized to act for a client
whom he professes to represent. The presumption, however, is one that exists
only in regards to proceedings before court. Doeller v. Mortgage Guarantee Co.,
166 Md. 500, 171 A. 856 (1934). In Friedman v. Booth Corp., supra, the court
said:
It may be that presumptions of authority are indulged in where an attorney
enters an appearance in a proceeding in a court before which he is
admitted to practice; but where, as here, the asserted agency is not one which
can be performed only by an attorney at law, the authority of a lawyer
is no more presumed than that of a layman.
An analysis of the Zeeb and Klein cases would lead to the conclusion that,
in the absence of special considerations, an agent need not submit proof of his
authority to act for a principal when filing an objection to a proposed merger.
Where the filing of an objection is merely a preliminary step and not binding,
as in Delaware, the burden of requiring a corporation to challenge the repre-
sentations of the agent is not unreasonable and therefor not a special considera-
tion. However, where an objection is binding and final, as in Ohio, it is a
special consideration that would necessitate proof of the agent's authority to act
for his principal. But in neither case, where the transaction is such that it can
be performed by either an attorney or layman, does an attorney stand in a better
position than a layman.
JOSEPH M. KOLMACIC
CRIMINAL LAW-SUBNORMAL MENTALITY AS AFFECTING CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY-Defendant, a mental defective, was convicted of first degree
murder for the killing of a police officer during an armed robbery and was
sentenced to death. On appeal, it was contended by defendant that the Court
must consider and be controlled by psychiatric reports of appellant's extreme
mental deficiency, and that these reports justified a sentence no higher than life
imprisonment. The State Supreme Court adopted the lower court's finding that
this case raised a problem of penology, and that, of the four theories upon
which punishment might be based, namely, reformation, restraint, retribution,
and deterrence, the deterrent theory should be applied here. The State Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's plea, based on the theory of "diminished responsi-
bility," whereby it was contended that defendant should not be held fully
responsible for his crime. Held: (1) that while appellant's mental deficiency
should be taken into consideration by the trial court in fixing sentence, it is not
necessary for the appellate court to reduce sentence from death to life imprison-
ment because appellant is a moron; (2) that the court considers, but is not
controlled by, psychiatric reports, makes its own appraisal of appellant's mental
capacity from facts, evidence, and observation; and upon such basis, makes an
appropriate sentence. Commonwealth v. Elliott, 371 Pa. 70, 89 A. 2d 782 (1952).
The authorities agree that criminal responsibility does not depend on a
defendant's mental age or whether his mind is above or below that of the
average or normal man. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 255 Mass. 9, 151 N. E. 74
(1926); State v. Gardner, 219 S. C. 97, 64 S. E. 2d 130 (1951). Since the
famed M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843), it has
been well settled that subnormal mentality is not a defense to crime unless the
accused is unable to distinguish between "right and wrong" in respect to the
particular act in question. Griffin v. State, 208 Ga. 746, 69 S. E. 2d 192 (1952).
Further, the majority of courts have refused to hold "weakness of mind" as an
excuse or a palliation reducing the degree of crime. If the accused cannot dis-
tinguish between right and wrong in relation to the act, he is deemed incapable
of entertaining a wrongful state of mind requisite to commit the crime, and
may plead insanity. Thus, a person is either "sane" and fully responsible for his
acts, or "insane" and wholly irresponsible. See Weihofen and Overholser, Mental
Disorders Affecting the Degree of a Crime, 56 Yale L. Rev. 959, 964 (1947).
Between these two extremes of "sanity" and "insanity" lie all shades of
disordered mental conditions. There are those who, although not totally insane,
possess poor judgment and inability to foresee the consequences of their acts.
In many cases of borderline mental deficiency, it can hardly be said that knowledge
of the nature and quality of the act or its wrongfulness exists. See Glueck,
Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 14 Va. L. Rev. 155; 171 (1928). As pointed
out by Mr. Justice Murphy in his dissenting opinion in Fisher v. U. S., 328 U. S.
463 (1947), the jury must either condemn such persons to death on the false
premise that they possess the mental requirements of a first degree murderer,
or free them completely from criminal responsibility; the jury may not find the
accused guilty of a lesser degree of murder by reason of a weakened or dis-
ordered intellect.
In the principal case, Judge Musmanno vigorously dissented from the
deterrent doctrine, by which the punishment is made to fit the crime not the
criminal. He quoted medical, clinical, and psychiatric reports which showed
that Elliott had
... no capacity for intelligent reasoning ... (or) for mastering new ideas....
He is childish, irresponsible, and easily led, with very superficial ideas or moral
values .... This boy is mentally deficient, and now rates, reacts, and reasons
on a middle-grade moron basis .... Diagnosis: Middle-grade Moron, Constitu-
tional Psychopathic Inferior.
The punishment should be applied according to the capability of the convicted,
as well as to the enormity of the delinquent act, says Judge Musmanno, and the
measure of the penalty should equal, and not exceed, the measure of the responsi-
bility. He feels that law and society cannot justly ask for expiation of Elliott's
crime in the electric chair. He must be restrained, not by death, but by life
imprisonment.
According to the theory of Partial or Diminished Responsibility, a criminal
who is the victim of a proven abnormal mental condition is held responsible for a
lesser grade of offense. For an extensive list of cases accepting and rejecting this
theory in which mental deficiency is taken into consideration, see 166 A. L. R.
1183. A defendant charged with murder, who is not so insane as to be
irresponsible for crime and thus not entitled to be acquitted, may still be suffering
from such mental disorder or "feebleness of mind or will" as to render him
incapable of "malice aforethought," "premeditation," or "deliberation" required
to constitute murder in the first degree. See Weihofen, Partial Insanity and
Criminal Intent, 24 I1. L. Rev. 505, 506 (1930). Inquiry into "premeditation"
and "deliberation" might rightly include an examination into the capabilities of
that mind itself. See Premeditation and Mental Capacity, 46 Col. L. Rev. 1005,
1011 (1946). A person who is mentally incapable of entertaining the wrongful
state of mind required to constitute a crime would not be held guilty of that
crime under application of this theory of Diminished Responsibility. See Mental
Disorders Affecting the Degree of Crime, supra.
Those objecting to this theory point out that there is difficulty in determining
whether "partial insanity" exists, and, if so, whether it had any connection with
the offense. There is the difficulty in knowing to what extent the criminal act
charged was prompted by a feeble mental condition, and to what extent by
sane, but criminal, motives. The greatest legal difficulty is that of drawing the
line between that degree of pathological mental condition which should exempt
from responsibility and that which should not. See Psychiatry and the Criminal
Law, supra.
In conclusion it may be pointed out that, while some legal writers are in
favor of the adoption of the Partial Responsibility theory, the majority of the
courts refuse to disturb past precedents. Until more definite standards are
established to prove the relation between mental deficiency and responsibility, the
"social desirability" of the Partial Responsibility theory is questionable.
NANCY-NELLIS WARNER
FUTURE INTFRESTS-HABENDUM CLAUSE--CONDITION SUBSEQUENT-
BASE OR DETERMINABLE FEE-X executed and delivered to A, trustees of a church,
a deed to one-half acre of land. The deed contained full covenants and warranties,
and was regular in form. The last line of the habendum clause contained the phrase,
"for church purposes only." The church took possession of the land under the deed
and erected a wooden structure which was used for church purposes. The lot
became unsuitable for the purpose intended. A negotiated a sale of the lot to B.
When a fee simple title was prepared and tendered, B refused to accept on the
ground that the provision in the habendum clause prohibited A from conveying
an indefeasible title. Held: A acquired indefeasible title and could convey the
realty in fee simple, and the phrase, "for church purposes only," did not reduce
the estate from an indefeasible title to a lesser state by creating a condition subse-
quent. Ange v. Ange, 71 S. E. 2d 19 (N. C. 1952).
Before the effect of the phrase "for church purposes only" may be determined,
its presence in the habendum clause will first be considered. The habendum is a
continuation of the premises. Since the premises are that part of the deed which
precedes the habendum and in which are recited the considerations, agreements,
or matters of fact, it is here that the certainty of the estate granted should be
set down. Sumner v. Williams, 8 Mass. 162 (1811). Thus "anything in the
habendum which tends to destroy the object and purpose of the grantor as
shown in the grant would of necessity be void." Yeager v. Farnsworth, 163
Iowa 537, 145 N. W. 87, 88 (1914). Since the terms of the habendum defines
the premises it is subsidiary to those of the premises and must yield to them.
Freudenberger Oil Co. v. Simmons, 75 W. Va. 339, 83 S. E. 995 (1914). As a
result, the habendum has deteriorated into a mere useless form, and the deed is
effectual without any habendum. 4 Kent's Comm. 468 (1832). It is not an
essential fact of the deed. Hart v. Galdner, 74 Miss. 153, 20 So. 877 (1896).
Since the habendum is an unnecessary form, and since it is the office of the
premises to name the grantor and grantee, and to describe with certainty the
estate granted, Clapp v. Byrnes, 3 App. Div. 38 N. Y. S. 1063, 1067 (2d Dep't.
1896), the deed is to be interpreted in its entirety. Thus the question to be
answered is whether the words, "for church purposes only," create an estate less
than an estate in fee simple absolute.
"An estate in fee simple is defeasible when it is subject to a condition subse-
quent, a special limitation, an executory limitation, or a combination of such
restrictions." Restatement, Property § 16 (1936). Whether such a phrase con-
stitutes any of the foregoing limitations will now be considered.
"An estate in fee simple subject to a condition subsequent is created by any
limitation which provides that, upon the occurrence of a stated event, the conveyor
or his successor in interest shall have the power to terminate the estate so
created." Restatement, Property, § 45 (1936). No precise technical words in a
deed are required to create a condition subsequent. Jones v. Williams, 132 Ga. 782,
64 S. E. 1081, 1082 (1909); Rustin v. Butler, 195 Ga. 389, 24 S. E. 2d 318 (1943).
There are certain usual words which, if included in the deed, tend to establish the
grant as subject to a condition subsequent; they are: "but if," "so that," "provided,"
"if it shall happen," or "upon condition;" but no form of expression is essential.
The phrase in the principal deed does not contain any of the usual words which
would lead to its construction as a condition. If it is doubtful as to whether
a clause is a condition, the court will not construe it as a condition, Chapin v.
School Dist. No. 2 in Winchester, 35 N. H. 445 (1857), since courts look on
conditions subsequent with disfavor. Byars et ux. v. Byars, 11 Tex. Civ. App.
565, 32 S. W. 925 (1895). If there is any reasonable construction which can
be given a deed so as to avoid forfeiture, it ought to receive such construction.
Wier v. Simmons, 55 Wis. 637, 13 N. W. 837 (1882). To clear up doubtful
clauses, some courts hold that the presence of an express reservation is necessary
for the creation of a condition subsequent, meaning the reservation must appear
plainly in the deed. Braddy v. Elliott, 146 N. C. 578, 60 S. E. 507 (1908). Other
courts hold that it is of primary importance to have an express reservation of the
right of reentry in the premises, Rooks Creek Evangelical Lutheran Church v. First
Lutheran Church of Pontiac, 290 111. 133, 124 N. E. 793 (1919), because such
a reservation, while not indispensable, is always important as evidence of the
intention to impose a condition subsequent, and will make certain that which
otherwise would be a matter of construction.
Other courts hold that the express reservation is one of several important
factors to be considered in a deed. Libby v. Winston, 207 Ala. 681, 93 So. 631
(1922). In this instance, the courts will construe the phrase as resulting in a
covenant, rather than a condition subsequent. Thus, much stress is laid on an
express reservation, or a provision for a right of reentry upon breach. Without
it, a statement of the motive or purpose of the grant is insufficient to create a
condition subsequent. First Presbyterian Church of Wilmington v. Bailey, 11
Del. Ch. 116, 97 A. 583 (1916). In Beran v. Harris, 91 Cal. App. 2d 562 P. 2d
107, 109 (1949), a provision that "the property is to be used for residence and
service station purposes only" would not be construed as creating a condition
subsequent, especially in the absence of any provision for forfeiture, or right of re-
entry or a power of termination. Where the habendum clause in a deed provided
"that the said land shall be held, used and reserved as a cemetery, and for no
other purpose," with no words of condition or right of reentry used, a condition
subsequent is not created. Toole v. Christ Church, Houston, Tex. Civ. App., 141
S. W. 2d 720 (1940). A deed conveying land "for levee purposes," without
more, was held not to create a condition subsequent. Nicholson v. Myers, 170
Miss. 441, 154 So. 282 (1934). From a review of the above cases, the court here
correctly decided that a statement of the purpose, without more, did not create
a condition subsequent.
Whether the phrase denotes a "special limitation," namely, that which causes
the created interest automatically to expire (as contrasted with divestment in a
condition subsequent) upon the occurrence of a stated event will next be
discussed.
A "special limitation," usually called a "qualified," "base," or "determinable
fee," is an interest or fee which may continue forever, but is apt to be terminated
without the assertion of the right of reentry. The uncertainty of the event and
the possibility that the fee may last forever render the fee determinable. Scobey
v. Beckman, 111 Ind. App. 574, 41 N. E. 2d 847 (1942). In order to create
a determinable fee, it is necessary that the words in the grant by which the
limitation is expressed relate to time in the sense of the concurrency of a specified
event. Such appropriate words are "until," "during," "so long as," and the like.
Holekamp Lumber Co. v. State Highway Commission, 173 S. W. 2d 938 (Mo.
1943). In Regular Predestinarian Baptist Church of Pleasant Grove v. Parker,
373 111. 607, 27 N. E. 2d 522 (1940), a deed to the trustees of a church which
contained the clause "to have and to hold for church purposes as long as the
same is used for a meeting place" created in the grantee a base or determinable
fee. One who is seized of such a fee may convey his estate, but the grantee
takes subject to the defects. Carpenter v. City of New Brunswick, 135 N. J.
Eq. 397, 39 A. 2d 40 (1944). When a limitation merely states the use for
which the land is conveyed, such limitation usually does not indicate an intent to
create a fee simple which is to expire automatically upon cessation of the use
named. Restatement, Property § 44, Comment M (1936). As stated in Allen v.
Trustees of Great Neck Free Church, 240 App. Div. 206, 269 N. Y. S. 341 (2d
Dep't 1934), where the granting clause of a deed conveyed a fee, the provision
of the habendum clause which limited the use to a specified purpose did not lessen
the effect of the granting clause; and the repugnancy must be resolved in favor
of the granting clause, in the absence of words creating a base fee or a condition
subsequent.
By the weight of authority, it is not necessary to state in the instrument
that the property is to revert to the transferor on the happening of the named
event. In Staack v. Detterding, 182 Iowa 582, 161 N. W. 44 (1917), a devise
to a widow "in fee simple so long as she will be my widow" gave the widow a
defeasible title. In Copps Chapel v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 120 Ohio St.
309, 166 N. E. 218 (1929), where a grant was made "so long as said lot is
held and used for church purposes," without any provision for forfeiture or
reversion, such a statement was held not to be a condition or limitation.
Since the phrase "for church purposes only" in the principal case does not
consist of the usual words that create a determinable or base fee, nor express
an intention to create a fee simple estate which is to expire automatically upon
the cessation of the use named, the estate in fee simple absolute was not thereby
reduced to a lesser estate.
Can the phrase in question be construed as having the effect of an executory
limitation? "The term 'executory limitation' denotes that part of the language
of a conveyance, by virtue of which the interest subject thereto, upon the
occurrence of a stated event, is to be divested, before the normal expiration thereof,
in favor of another interest in a person other than the conveyor or his successor
in interest." Restatement, Property, § 25, (1936). The deed in the principal
case did not provide that upon the happening of a specified event, title to the
fee would pass to a third person.
It is clear that the phrase "for church purposes only" did not in and of
itself create a condition or limitation which would defeat the fee simple conveyed
by X to A.
STANLEY J. ZLOCKI
INSURANCE-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Two recent cases, Harding v. Penn-
sylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co., 171 Pa. 236, 90 A. 2d 589 (1952) and Beley v.
Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co., 171 Pa. 253, 90 A. 2d 597 (1952), have
required determination on a question not heretofore raised in any appellate
court, viz., Does the Korean action constitute "war" for the purpose of making
the "war clauses" in insurance policies operative? Judge Dithrich, who wrote the
majority opinion in both cases, said that this was not only a question of first
impression in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, but that these cases were
the first appellate court decisions on the subject in the United States.
The cases differ only in the manner in which the insured met death. Harding
was killed in a railroad accident while enroute to camp for military training,
whereas, Beley was killed in action in Korea. Both life insurance policies, issued
by the defendant company, provided for double indemnity in case of accidental
death. It was expressly stated however that (1) the provision would be inappli-
cable "if said death shall result by reason of . . . military . . . service in time of
war;" and (2) that the policy would terminate "if insured shall . . . engage in
military . . . service in time of war."
The defendant company paid the face values of the policies but resisted pay-
ment of the double indemnity benefits, contending that insureds' deaths resulted
from "war" and were, therefore, within the exception clauses of the policies.
Plaintiff's, as beneficiaries, claimed the accidental death benefits under the double
indemnity clauses.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in both cases, reversed the lower courts'
findings and held that the fighting in Korea is at most an "undeclared war" and
that the plaintiffs were, therefore, entitled to recover the full amount of the
policies, including the accidental death benefits.
It is significant that the provisions "in time of war" as used in the principal
policies are susceptible of more than one meaning. Edwards v. Life & Casualty
Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 210 La. 1024, 29 So. 2d 50 (1946). This uncertainty
develops when the liability of the insurer is made to depend on the interpretation
of the particular terminology in the provisions. One view of interpretation is
that the mere "status" of the insured as a member of the Nation's armed forces
is sufficient to limit or exempt the liability of the insurer. Jorgenson v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 136 N. J. L. 148, 55 A. 2d 2 (1947). In this group the
death of the insured, while in the military service in time of war, makes the
double indemnity clause inapplicable. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. McLoed, 70
Ga. App. 181, 27 S. E. 2d 871 (1943). Another view is that before the limiting
or exempting provision should become operative, the cause of the insured's
death must be shown to have been a direct or incidental "result" of military
service. Smith v. Soverign Camp, 204 S. C. 193, 28 S. E. 2d 808 (1944). There
is also a third view of construction: that the exemption of liability is construed as
meaning death of the insured while "engaged" in the duties of military service.
Long v. St. Joseph Life Ins. Co., 248 S. W. 923 (Mo. 1923); Wolford v. Equitable
Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, 162 Pa. 259, 57 A. 2d 581 (1948).
In life insurance policies of this character, the intention of the contracting
parties as to the meaning of "war" is the basic issue. Where such provisions
import various meanings, necessitating construction, the general holding is that
the words are construed in their legal sense. Rosenau v. Idaho Mutual Benefit
Association, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P. 2d 227 (1944). On the other hand, if the
terms are unambiguous, it is presumed that the parties intended their plain and
ordinary meaning. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Reed, 251 S. W. 2d 150 (Texas 1952).
As brought out in the Beley Case, supra, this nation is not at "war" in
Korea in the technical or legal sense, in the manner in which the words are used
in the policy; therefore, the meaning which permits recovery must be applied.
War, in the legal sense, can never exist without an act or declaration by
Congress. Under Art. I, sec. 8, clause 11, of the Constitution of the United
States, Congress is vested with the war-making powers. The existence or non-
existence of a state of war is a political question to be determined by the political
department of the government. In re Wulzer, 235 Fed. 362 (S. D. Ohio 1916).
Until there has been some act or declaration by this authorized department of the
government, that a war does exist, the courts cannot take judicial notice that a
state of war exists. Rosenau v. Idaho Mutual Benefit Association, supra. But
once the date of a war, i.e., its commencement or termination is fixed by Con-
gress, the courts are bound by this determination. United States v. Anderson,
9 Wall. 56 (1869). Since there has been no act or declaration by Congress
that may be characterized as a formal recognition or creation of a state of war
in Korea, it follows that the conflict in Korea is not a declared war.
The crucial question then arises as to whether the courts must give judicial
notice to an undeclared war for the purpose of relieving the insurer from liability
under these policies. The decisions are not in accord as to whether a formal
declaration by Congress of the existence of a state of war is an essential pre-
requiste to judicial notice: West v. Palmetto, 202 S. C. 422, 25 S. E. 2d 475
(1943); Savage v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 57 F. Supp. 620 (W. D. La. 1944);
or whether the existence of a war is determined by existing conditions: New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F. 2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946), Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Davis, 79 Ga. App. 336, 53 S. E. 2d 571 (1949). There is a valid
distinction between declared and undeclared war, as pointed out in New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Durham, 166 F. 2d 874 (10th Cir. 1948). Where this distinction
has been recognized, the insurance companies in drawing up the policies, especially
since Pearl Harbor, have extended the term "war" to include undeclared war.
Stinson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 167 F. 2d 233 (D. C. Cir. 1948); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Durham, supra.
A review of the cases shows that the construction of such provisions depends
on the particular phraseology of the policy contract. Where the construction
or interpretation by the courts is necessary because the policy contains ambiguous
language, the courts have usually adopted the meaning which is more favorable
to the insured. Williams v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 220 Mo. App.
355, 1 S. W. 2d 1034 (1928). It is a rule of insurance law that every doubtful
clause must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the
insurer. Atkinson v. Indian National Life Ins. Co., 194 Ind. 563, 143 N. E.
629 (1924); Caruso v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 25 N. J. 318, 53 A.
2d 222 (1947). It is incumbent upon the insurer, therefore, to make the
meaning clear. As stated in Aschenbrenner v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 292 U. S. 80 (1934):
The phraseology of contracts of insurance is that chosen by the insurer and
the contract in fixed form is tendered to the prospective policy holder who is
often without technical training and who rarely accepts it with a lawyer at his
elbow. So if its language is reasonably open to two constructions, that more
favorable to the insured will be adopted. ...
The court in the Harding Case, supra, concluded that so long as the term
"war" imported various meanings, and the insurer failed to make clear the
intended meaning, it failed to prove that the term "war" as used in the policy
applied to an undeclared war as well as to a declared war.
It is clear that the insurance companies are faced with a difficult task in
framing war exclusion clauses due to the ambiguity inherent in word usage. The
remedy for this apparent difficulty would be a uniform war clause for life
insurance policies in which the word "war" is unambiguously defined, thereby
eliminating the necessity of judicial interpretation.
ROSEMARIE SERINO
TORTS-ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-RIGHT OF CHILDREN TO RECOVER
DAMAGES FROM ONE WHO HAS ENTICED A PARENT FROM THE HOME.-Plaintiffs,
the wife and two children of John Kleinow, brought suit against defendant
Jean Ameika for having enticed him away from their home. They sought to
recover damages against the defendant for deprivation of their rights to his
love, bounty, and affection.
Held: the action cannot be maintained. The suit as to the wife is in substance
an alienation of affections action barred by the state's Heart Balm Act. The chil-
dren are also prevented from suing on the grounds that no precedent exists
to substantiate a cause of action, and it would be unwise for the court to
create one. Kleinow v. Ameika, 19 N.J. Super. 165, 88 A. 2d 31 (1952).
Whether or not a minor child may recover damages from a third person
for alienation of a parent's affection is a relatively novel question. It has received
more attention in the past six years than ever before. The increase in cases is
indubitably due to the changing conception modern society has placed upon the
family relationship.
Previously, the husband was lord and master; all other members of the
family claimed their rights through him. Daily v. Parker, 152 F. 2d 174 (7th
Cir. 1945). Consequently, the right of a husband to maintain an action against
one who wrongfully alienated his wife's affections, and thus deprived him of his
marital rights to her consortium, has long been recognized in England as well as
in this country. Cf. Boland v. Stanley, 88 Ark. 562, 115 S. W. 163 (1909).
The wife, although denied the same action previously, is now generally allowed
to sue as a result of the Married Women's Acts. Nolin v. Pearson, 191 Mass.
283, 77 N. E. 890 (1906). Since the gist of an alienation of affections is loss
of "consortium", which is usually defined as the conjugal affections, society,
companionship, fellowship, and assistance of the wife, Boland v. Stanley, supra,
and since there can be no such consortium rights in a child as regards his parents,
what are the rights of a child against a third person who has alienated the
affections of a parent?
At common law "the child hath no property in his father or guardian." 3
Blackstone's Commentaries 143. Hence the child could have no right against a
third person who injured his relation with the parent. Prosser, Torts 101 (1941).
Today, still, in accordance with this common law precedent, the great majority
of courts that have passed upon the question are in agreement with the principal
case in holding that the child cannot maintain an action for alienation of a
parent's affections. This lack of precedent seems to be the main dissuading factor,
but the Heart Balm acts also play an important part in states that have enacted
such legislation.
For the most part, the decisions have been ones of first impression in the
states deciding them. A sample list of the courts refusing to allow an alienation
of affections action by the child against a third person who has enticed a parent
from the home, follows:
An action for alienation of affections must grow out of the marriage rela-
tion. Coulter v. Coulter, 73 Colo. 144, 214 Pac. 400 (1923). The loss of
affection is a matrimonial wrong only, and a minor child has no legal right to
the personal presence or care of a parent; the parent may be bound to support the
child by other proceedings. Nelson v. Richwagen, 326 Mass. 485, 95 N. E. 2d 545
(1950). If the action did exist, the Heart Balm Act prohibits the children
as well as the spouse from enforcing it. Katz v. Katz, 197 Misc. 412, 95 N. Y. S.
2d 863 (1950). Although a previous statute conferred the right in the child,
the statute's revision with consequent omission of the child's right, read in
conjunction with the Heart Balm Act of 1939, excludes the action. Rudley v.
Tobias, 84 Cal. App. 2d 454, 190 P. 2d 984 (1948). No cause of action existed
at common law, and no statute creates one. Henson v. Thomas, 231 N. C. 173,
56 S. E. 2d 432 (1949).
Most of the courts bluntly state that they do not wish to engage in judicial
empiricism. Cf. Rudley v. Tobias, supra; Katz v. Katz, supra. A few courts,
though, have felt that the decision was theirs to make, yet refused to sanction the
action on the ground that it would be unwise to do so. Morrow v. Yannantuono,
152 Misc. 134, 273 N. Y. S. 912 (1934); Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 56 A.
2d 768 (1947).
Finally, there are a few courts that thought the decision theirs to make and
chose to allow the action. Judge Evans, in reversing the order of the district
court dismissing the complaint, stated in Daily v. Parker, supra:
The father, the mother, and the children ordinarily constitute the family.
Each is entitled to the society and the companionship of the others. Within
limits . . . each is entitled to shelter, food, clothing, and schooling and to
the social, the moral support, guidance, and protection of their father,
though in turn they can contribute only companionship and inspiration . . .
Even in the common law, in 1945, if no precedents be found, courts can
hardly be advisedly called radical if they divulge in law-making by decisions,
or in a word, engage in judicial empiricism.
Similar reasoning was used in Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N. E.
2d 810 (1947), where much weight was placed upon Sec. 19 of Art. II of the
Illinois Constitution, which provides: "Every person ought to find a certain
remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his
person, property or reputation .. "
Another decision, primarily based on premises similar to the Daily case, held
that the Heart Balm Act prohibits only the injured spouse from suing, not the
child, since a statute in derogation of common law rights should be strictly con-
strued. Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W. D. Mich. 1949). In Miller v.
Monsen, 37 N. W. 2d 543 (Minn. 1949), the action was also allowed, the court
saying that: "Many rights formerly vested in the husband are now vested in
other members of the family. We cannot refuse to recognize such changes
without ignoring the obvious."
It is submitted that the preservation of the family unity is a laudable and
praiseworthy object that the law almost always endeavors to safeguard. Allowing
the action under consideration would be a step in that direction, since the fear
of paying damages to the whole family would act as a deterrent to those who
would entice a parent from the family.
However, the end result of sanctioning such a cause of action would only
be, in actuality, circumventing the Heart Balm acts where such legislation has
been passed: the parent, merely by bringing the suit on behalf of the minor
child, could thus sue indirectly for alienation of affections. Even more, in all
states, the precedent would be a dangerous one: if the children could sue for the
loss of affection, then the action might be allowed a brother, sister, grandparent,
etc. It was to prevent just such a flood of litigation that many legislatures passed
the Heart Balm acts which have achieved commendable results in curtailing
many useless and harassing lawsuits. As was said in Morrow v. Yannantuono,
supra: "To uphold this complaint . . . would mean that everyone whose cheek
is tinged by the the blush of shame would rush into court to ask punitive damages
vo compensate them for their distress of body and mind..."
KENNETH I. LAPRADE
TORT-POLITICAL LIBEL-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION-During the 1950
Utah political campaign defendant, Farm Bureau, distributed a two-page letter
to its members concerning action taken and opinions reflected by its Board of
Directors at a recent meeting. Also disseminated were copies of the Con-
gressional Record containing a speech by Senator Styles Bridges which commented
.on the "Farmers Union". Additional information, in the form of a mimeographed
enclosure, entitled the "Farm Bureau Position on Election of Senators and Con-
gressmen, was forwarded. In reference to the House Granger Bill, this enclosure
,continued, "Representative Granger has exhibited his evident animosity toward
farm organizations (except the communist-dominated Farmers Union)." This
-enclosure was distributed by Farm Bureau Secretary, Frank Shelley, not only to
the Farm Bureau members, but also to certain Utah newspapers for publication
and circulation.
Farmers Union brought this libel action against Farm Bureau for compensa-
tory damages arising out of an alleged defamatory publication that Farmers
Union was "communist-dominated". The defendants pleaded defensively that,
in public interest and truth, the publication was fair comment and privileged.
The trial court held, as a matter of Utah law, that it was libelous per se,
leaving it to the jury to decide whether the libelous statement was true or
false, and if false, whether its publication resulted in damage to the plaintiff.
The jury found for the Farmers Union, awarding $25,000 thereon. Farm Bureau
then appealed, stating that the trial court had erroneously refused to admit in
evidence material tending to prove plaintiff-appellee communist-dominated. The
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, affirmed the judgment awarded
by the trial court. Utah State Farm Bureau Federation v. National Farm Union
Life Insurance Corporation, 198 F. 2d 20 (10th Cir., 1952).
In respect to the principal case the issue to be examined, therefore, is
"whether it is defamatory per se to charge a person as being a communist or an
organization as being communist-dominated"?
In order for a communication or publication to be privileged, as defendant
alleged in the principal case, the communication must be by and to one who has a
right, duty, or interest in the matter. People v. Faber, 29 Cal. App. 2d 751,
77 P. 2d 921 (1938); Briggs v. Brown, 55 Fla. 417, 46 So. 325 (1908); Smith
v. Smith, 194 S. C. 247, 9 S. E. 2d 584 (1940). Thus, if the speaker or
publisher of the alleged slanderous or libelous words has an interest or duty
in the subject matter of the communication, and the hearer or reader a simul-
taneous concern, the doctrine of qualified privilege applies. Williams v. Standard
Examiner Publishing Co., 83 Utah 31, 27 P. 2d 1 (1933). A qualified
privileged communication extends to all communications made bona fide upon
any subject matter in which a communicating party has an interest, or in
reference to which he has a duty to a person having a corresponding interest
or duty; and the privilege embraces cases where the duty is not a legal one,
but where it is of a moral or social character of imperfect obligation. Spielberg
v. A. Kuhn and Brothers, 39 Utah 276, 116 Pac. 1027 (1911).
A further projection of this pattern of legal reasoning demonstrates that
comment or criticism ordinarily immune from liability for defamation, deals
only with such things as invite public attention or call for public comment or
criticism, and does not follow a public man into his private life or domestic
concerns. If such an attack pursues an individual further, the writer writes at his
peril for defamation. Patten v. Harper's Weekly, 93 Misc. 368, 158 N. Y. S.
70 (1916).
In necessary further distinction between a privileged communication, an
absolutely privileged communication, and a defamatory communication, it was
held in Abraham v. Baldwin, 52 Fla. 151, 42 So. 591 (1906), that a privileged
communication or statement in libel or slander is one which, except for the
occasion, or the circumstances under which it is made, would be defamatory and
actionable. An absolutely privileged communication is one in respect to the
occasion and the matter to which it is made, no remedy can be had in civil action,
however hard it may bear upon a person who claims to be injured thereby,
Reid v. Thomas, 99 Cal. App. 719, 279 P. 226 (1929); and even though it may
have been made maliciously.
Thus, a communication is defamatory if it tends to harm or prejudice the
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community,
including even a substantial and respectable minority thereof. Restatement, Torts,
§ 559 (1938). In continuing this path of analysis there is substantial conclusion
that any false and malicious writing published about another is libelous per se,
when its tendency is to render the person contemptible in public estimation, or
expose him to public hatred or contempt. Talbot v. Mack, 41 Nev. 245, 169
Pac. 25 (1917).
Thus, with the preceding legal principles as established criteria and premises,
further consideration must be given to relevant cases of the "Communist-political
libel" question. The effectiveness of this substantiation continues to such extent
that the courts hold defamatory and libelous per se a publication which refers
to a person as "red", if the word is understood by the readers as referring to a
person who believes in disobedience to law and forcible appropriation of all
property by the state. Toomey v. Jones, 124 Okla. 167, 254 Pac. 736 (1927).
In contemporary consideration as to liabilities involved, Judge Learned
Hand, in Grant v. Readers' Digest Association, 151 F. 2d 733 (2nd Cir., 1945),
cert. denied, 66 S. Ct. 492 (1946), affirmed the supposition that libel was the
arousing of "hatred, contempt, scorn, or obloquy, or shame," and that to be
actionable the words must be such as would affect "right-thinking" people.
Judge Hand further asserted that under New York Law it was libelous to write
of a lawyer that he has acted as agent of the Communist Party and is a believer
in its aims and methods.
Parallel to New York law, it is established Illinois law that it is libelous
per se to write that a man or a corporation is a communist or a communist
sympathizer, " . . . because the label of communist today in the minds of many
average and respectable persons places the accused beyond the pale of respectability,
and makes him a symbol of public hatred." Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F. 2d 619
(7th Cir. 1947).
Similarly, in a libel action arising out of the refusal to testify before the
House Un-American Activities Committee, Judge Yankwich, in Cole v. Loew's
Inc., 8 F. R. D. 508 (1948), declared:
I have stated that in California an accusation of communist against a person
is libelous. This is so because, under California law, every false and un-
privileged publication which exposes a person to hatred, contempt, ridicule,
or obloquy, or causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency
to injure him in his occupation is libelous per se.
Today, coincident with the great danger of injuring a person's character and
reputation by an accusation of communist relationship, an increasing concern is
being manifested by the courts to protect these rights to a good name. The
preceding cases substantiate this intention.
Correlatively, the most recent cases decided on this issue affirmed, as in
Spanel v. Pegler, supra, that writing that a man is a communist is libelous per se,
since the minds of many average persons will be affected to such extent that he
will be labeled beyond the pale of respectability and will be made a symbol of
public hatred. Ward v. League for justice, 154 Ohio St. 367, 93 N. E. 2d 723
(1950). Parallel also, to the principal case the court in Pennsylvania Common
Pleas held in Americans for Democratic Action v. Meade, 72 D & C 306 (1951),
it was libelous to write that:
. . . The organization was flirting with communism, was infiltrated with
communists, and was a communist front organization, must be regarded
as fairly and reasonably capable of charging that the organization had
Communist Party members, has harboured communists, espoused Communist
doctrines, was influenced in its policies by communists or communism, and
that candidates for public office supported by it were receiving support from
communists.
In distinguishing subsequent or further publication, it was held in Dilling
v. Illinois Publishing and Printing Co., 340 Ill. App. 303, 91 N. E. 2d 635 (1950),
that although the name of plaintiff was read in a resolution of the California
State American Legion Convention charging her with being a communist, and
defendants printed a release thereon, this matter was not libelous per se.
Although chiefly concerned with the weight of authority on the issue, it is
nevertheless necessary to consider the minority view. The courts of New York
have given the outstanding opinions on the points of view. This consideration
of the minority opinion, although overruled by subsequent cases, Levy v. Gelber,
175 Misc. 746, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 148 (1941), and Grant v. Readers' Digest Ass'n,
supra, is succinctly found in the words of Judge Pecora in Garriga v. Richfield,
174 Misc. 315, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 544 (1944), to this effect:
The fact remains, however, that the Communist Party, under existing law,
may function as a political party. It may place upon our ballots its candidates
for public office-even for the highest in the land-and seek support for
them.
It may, like any other established political party, proclaim its principles
and invite public approval of them. At least, while it possesses that status
and those rights, it cannot be held that it is defamatory per se to say of
one that he is affiliated with, or a member of, the Communist Party, any
more than it would be to say that he is a member of any other legally
recognized political party.
. . . To deprive our citizens of the right freely to debate political issues, or
to allude to the political affiliations of others, is to make a breach in the dike
which protects our cherished institutions. Far better it is to preserve that right
unhampered-even with the abuses which frequently attend its exercise in
the heat of political passion-than to limit it at the possible loss of our
constitutional liberties.
An altogether different matter, in relation to the instant issue, presents itself
in slander. Words allegedly uttered orally charging plaintiff with being a
communist and a communist "plant" are not slanderous per se. Gross v. Malland,
200 Misc. 5, 108 N. Y. S. 2d 822 (1951). Similarly, in McAndrews v. Scranton
Rep. Publishing Co., 364 Pa. 502, 72 A. 2d 780 (1950), the court held that
saying that a man is a communist or a socialist is not defamatory. Likewise, in
McDonald v. Lieber, 184 Pa. 812, 167 So. 450 (1936), it was stated that it
was not libelous or slanderous per se to charge one with being a member of, or
affiliated with, the Communist Party.
Thus, it is submitted, the issue must be decided in the affirmative, according
to prevailing judicial determination, that it is libelous per se to call a person a
"communist," or an organization "communist-dominated."
GEORGE J. BERTAIN, JR.
TORTS-WARRANTIES-RES IPSA LOQUITUR-NEGLIGENCE-Action by Rose
M. Day against the Grand Union Company and the F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co.
for injuries sustained when a bottle of beer exploded as she picked it off the
counter of the first named defendant's self-service store. From a judgment of the
Supreme Court, Schenectady County, dismissing her complaint, the plaintiff
appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed and ordered a new
trial on the grounds that the evidence established a prima facie case of negligence
against the storekeeper. Day v. Grand Union Co., 113 N. Y. S. 2d 436 (1952).
Contrary to the above decision, the court in Lasky v. Economy Stores, 319
Mass. 224, 65 N. E. 2d 305 (1946) held there could be no recovery for personal
injuries upon a breach of implied warranty of fitness and merchantability because
the plaintiff sustained the injury before the purchase price was paid to the cashier,
at which time title will pass and the delivery becomes absolute. It has been held
that, until the customer paid for the merchandise he wishes to purchase at the
checking counter, the merchandise is in the undisputed possession of the store.
Gargaro v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 22 Tenn. App. 70, 118 S. W. 2d 561
(1938). Also cf. Restatement, Contracts 58 (1932). The courts, in these two
cases, embrace the well established principle of law that there can be no recovery
upon a breach of implied warranty resting on contract, for delivery is conditional,
and becomes absolute on payment to the cashier, at which time title passes.
In Alagood v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 135 S. W. 2d 1056 (Tex. Civ. App.
1940) the court denied the plaintiff relief because the bottle of coca cola that
exploded and injured him was not in the possession and control of the defendant,
but had been in the possession of the plaintiff a short time before the accident;
therefore, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable. In Curley v.
Ruppert, 272 App. Div. 438, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 578 (1947), the defendant delivered
to the plaintiff, three days before the explosion, the bottle of beer that caused his
injury. The court held res ipsa loquitur would not apply in this instance because
the beer was not under the control or management of the defendant at the time the
injury incurred. Cf. Rufjin v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 311 Mass. 514, 42 N. E.
2d 259 (1942); Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. Gretes, 182 Va. 138, 27 S. E. 2d 925
(1943); Winfree v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 19 Tenn. App. 144, 83 S. W. 2d
903 (1935).
If the court in Day v. Grand Union Co. would have strictly adhered to the
principles of law, as set out in the above-mentioned cases, it would have had
before it an injured plaintiff seeking compensation for that which someone is
ostensibly responsible. If he had then asked relief under the theory of implied
warranty, he would have been denied recovery since there was no sale at the
time of the injury; if he had asked relief under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
the court would deny him relief since the defendant had no control or management
over the bottled beverage at the time of the accident.
Acknowledging these principles of law, the court in Day v. Grand Union Co.,
supra, stated:
The relationship of the parties had been set in the direction of entering
into a contract by the storekeeper's general invitation to the public to come
in; and the customer was acting upon the invitation, but if the classic tests
to be applied to contracts are to be employed here there was yet no contract,
and, of course, no implied warranty resting upon contract .... When, there-
fore, a self-service store invites the customer both to come on the premises
and to take physical possession of merchandise in the course of entering into
a purchase and sale contractual relationship, and the customer is injured by
the unexpected dangerous behavior of the article which until the instant had
been in the exclusive possession of the storekeeper, enough has been shown,
we think, to make admissible an inference of negligence without proof of
active negligence.
The court further stated that the injured plaintiff had sufficient grounds to state
a cause of action based on implied warranty; that the very purpose of our modern
self-service markets is such that, when the plaintiff took physical possession of the
bottle in question, this amounted to an acceptance of the defendant's offer; that
nothing more remained for the plaintiff to do but to pay the purchase price to the
cashier; that since the plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to do this, enough was
shown to support the finding of a sale or a contract to sell.
The court justly held, in the principal case, that the plaintiff's complaint
stated sufficient facts to proceed to trial.
PHILIP C. VALENTI
